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EDITORIAL
Adam Averell Ross died at his home
in Ardmore, Pennsylvania, on Saturday,
June 15th, and was buried near his
summer estate on the eastern shore of Maryland. His going
creates a vacancy in the profession of accountancy which will
not be wholly filled. Other men will come into the field well
equipped and ready to advance the interests of accountancy.
They will have abundant opportunity for the exercise of their
talents and goodwill. But when one of those who labored when
the profession was young passes from the scene there is always
a feeling that something has gone for which there can never be
full compensation. The men who have grown up with account
ancy in America know the name Adam Ross even if some of them
in remote parts of the country had not met him. In the early
days he was one of the few who built up a profession in Pennsyl
vania, but his view of things was never obscured by state lines.
He always believed in the national breadth of accountancy and
was active in the administrative and other affairs of the old Amer
ican Association of Public Accountants and its successor, the pres
ent American Institute of Accountants. Until his final illness
made it impossible for him to participate actively in the work
of the Institute he took an important part in the functions of the
organization. He served for several years as treasurer and was
a member of council and of many committees. He was an ac
countant of the kind which has made the profession estimable.
He was a kindly, lovable friend and a delightful companion.
Above all he was a Christian gentleman.
The Profession
Is Bereaved

It seems probable that the decision
Accountant Not Liable
of
the supreme court of the state of
to Third Parties
New York in Ultra Mares v. Touche,
et al., reported in the New York Law Journal, June 14, 1929, will
become a leading case, and if, in the event of appeal, the judg124

Editorial
ment be confirmed it will constitute a precedent of the utmost
importance, not only to accountants, but to all professional men
whose services to clients may be the object of attack by third
parties. It is remarkable that such a precedent was not set long
ago. There have been other cases in which the responsibility
of accountants was involved—for example, the Kingston Cot
ton Mills case is familiar to every accountant, and there are other
noted cases which bear upon the duty and the liability of the
accountant—but in the Ultra Mares Corporation matter the con
troversial question of what might be called the breadth of re
sponsibility is brought squarely forward, and the court decides,
as it has always seemed inevitable that a court would decide,
against the rather preposterous theory that an accountant or
other professional man has a pecuniary or even a moral respon
sibility to persons outside the contract who subsequently may
have, or may claim to have, an interest in the fruit of the con
tract. There has been a great deal of loose talk about holding
professional practitioners to account for the whole effect, fore
seen or unforeseen, of their professional acts. And, in truth,
it is a noble theory that each one of us should be charged with
the effect of the furthest ripple spreading from every pebble he
flings in every pool. As a tenet of philosophy, the doctrine of
total liability is debatable. As a practical method it does not
merit consideration. Like many fine-spun theories, this one
will not carry weight and it snaps at the first strain. To apply
it to the affairs of today would induce chaos and clutter up the
courts with an inextricable tangle of suit and counter-suit. We
should be litigated to death.
The Ultra Mares case was ideal in many
ways. It had all the elements which
were needed to make a clear-cut issue.
We may differ radically from the court in its reference to the
question of negligence, but that is not the point at issue now.
The fact is that the court apparently adopted the view
expressed by the jury on this point. To the parties concerned
in the suit this is an important matter for personal reasons, and
the negligence assumed may not seem to have been demon
strated by the evidence. To the public it is important, because it
strengthens the force of the court’s decision which finds that even
where negligence may be assumed liability to third parties does
125
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not arise. The language of the decision may become classic. In
future one will often hear the expression “to assume a potential
liability to practically the entire world.” The full text of the
decision is brief. Its significance to the accounting profession
is great. Mr. Justice Walsh said:
“This action was tried before the court and a jury and resulted in a
verdict for the plaintiff. Motions were made at the close of the plain
tiff’s case and again at the conclusion of the trial to dismiss the complaint
upon which decision was reserved. After the rendition of a verdict a
motion was made to set same aside, as to which decision also was reserved.
Defendants are public accountants. In February of 1924 they were em
ployed by Fred Stern & Company, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Stern),
to audit its books and prepare a balance sheet as of December 31, 1923.
The audit was made and the balance sheet prepared. Attached to the
balance sheet was a certificate of defendants attesting to their examina
tion and certifying that the balance sheet was in accordance therewith
and represented in their opinion a true and correct view of Stern’s finan
cial condition as of December 31, 1923. Defendants negligently per
formed their work. The balance sheet prepared by them was incorrect
and showed Stern to be a going concern with assets greatly in excess of
liabilities, whereas had defendants’ audit been carefully made the balance
sheet would have shown that Stern was insolvent. Defendants were
not informed by Stern that the balance sheet was to be used by it for any
particular purpose or that the same was to be presented to any particular
person or persons. They knew generally that the same would be used
by Stern to evidence its financial condition; that it probably would be
exhibited to banks or to creditors or to stock brokers or purchasers or
sellers; that balance sheets prepared by auditors are used for the pur
pose of securing credit and that the balance sheet furnished by them might
be used by Stern to extend Ioans, secure credit and to induce banks and
others to advance money to it; also that lenders to whom Stern might
apply for Ioans would probably rely upon the balance sheet as indicative
of its financial condition. Beginning in March, 1924, and continuing for
the balance of the year, plaintiff advanced to Stern large sums of money,
relying upon the correctness of the balance sheet prepared by defendants.
In the latter part of 1924 Stern was adjudged a bankrupt. Some of the
moneys so advanced were not repaid to plaintiff. It is to recover the
amount of these unpaid advances that this action was brought. Neg
ligence is not actionable unless there is a breach of a duty owing by de
fendants to plaintiff. There must exist between the party inflicting the
injury on the one injured some privity by contract or otherwise by
reason of which the former owes some legal duty to the latter. Con
tractually, defendants owed no duty to plaintiff because no such rela
tionship existed between them, nor was there such privity between the
plaintiff and the defendants as to impose upon the latter a liability to
the former for their negligence in performing their contract obligation
with Stern. While in this state a party may sue on a contract made ex
pressly for his benefit, though he is not a party thereto, the doctrine has
not been extended so as to place upon the promisee under a contract a
duty to all who either potentially or incidentally may be beneficiaries
thereof. The doctrine of beneficial interest is recognized as an exception
to the general rule, which proceeds on the natural presumption that a
contract is intended only for the benefit of those who are parties to it,
and therefore before a stranger can avail himself of its benefits he must
at least show that it was intended for his direct benefit. The right of the
beneficiary to sue on contracts made for his benefit is confined to a limited
class of cases (Seaver v. Ransom, 234 N. Y., 233), in which this neither
categorically nor in principle is included. To hold that defendants’ duty
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extended not only to Stern, but to all persons to whom Stern might exhibit
the balance sheet and who would act in reliance thereon, would compel
defendants to assume a potential liability to practically the entire world.
The law does not go so far, but limits the liability to those for whose direct
benefit, to defendants’ knowledge, the work for Stern was performed
(Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S., 195; Day v. Reynolds, 23 Hun, 131;
Glawatz v. Peoples Guaranty Search Co., 49 A. D., 465; Derry v. Peek,
L. R., 14 App. Cas., 337; Le Lievre v. Gould, 1 QB., 491; National Wire &
Steel Co. v. Hunt, 312 Ill., 245). The cases relied on by plaintiff are no
authority to the contrary. In Glanzer v. Shepard (in 233 N. Y., 236)
plaintiff, to defendant’s knowledge, was a direct beneficiary of the work
performed by defendant. So also in the cases in other jurisdictions where
liability has been fastened on abstracters, notaries, inspectors, etc., for
negligently furnishing a certificate or performing work, it has invariably
been shown that the work was to be performed or the certificate made
to the knowledge of the one performing the work or issuing the certificate;
that the same was for direct use and benefit of the injured persons (Econ
omy Building & Loan Ass'n v. West Jersey Title Guaranty Co., 64 N. J. L.,
27; Denton v. Nashville Title Co., 112 Tenn., 320; Murphy v. Fidelity Ab
stract & Title Co., 114 Washington, 77; Western Loan Co. v. Silver Abstract
Co., 31 Mont., 448). International Products Co. v. Erie R.R. (244 N. Y.,
331) merely holds that a negligent statement when acted upon by one
to whom a duty is owing may be the basis for the recovery of damages.
McPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (in 217 N. Y., 382) is an extension of the
doctrine of Thomas v. Winchester (6 N. Y., 397), as liberalized by Devlin
v. Smith (89 N. Y., 470) and Statler v. Ray Manufacturing Co. (195 N. Y.,
478). The rule in these cases is that a person supplying goods or ma
chinery which may be used by others, which articles were negligently
made, are reasonably certain to place the lives and the limbs of others
in peril, is under a duty to make same carefully, and the right to enforce
liability for the manufacturer’s negligence is not confined to the imme
diate buyer, but extends to the persons or class of persons for whose use
the thing is supplied. Liability in such cases is held to rest not upon con
tract or direct privity between the manufacturer and the persons injured,
but upon the general duty which the law imposes on everyone to refrain
from doing that which is dangerous to the lives and limbs of others. This
doctrine has not been extended beyond personal injury cases. As de
fendants were under no duty to plaintiff, no cause of action against them
has been established, and hence the complaint must be dismissed. This
determination renders unnecessary a consideration of the other grounds
urged by defendant to set aside the verdict. Submit order on notice.

At first reading there may be a slight
feeling of regret in the minds of a few
perfectionists who will find in this
decision something a little short of the ideal. Someone may
say that the limitation of responsibility of the accountant
detracts from the prestige of accountancy. Many will feel
that there is a danger in the repudiation of the theory of
wide-spread responsibility; but, on the other hand, it is in
conceivable that a judgment for the plaintiff could have been
given by any competent jurist. Let us consider an analogous
case in another profession in order to see what might be the
result of attempting to apply the doctrine of “liability to the
entire world.” A man consults his family physician, submits
127
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to an examination and obtains from the physician a statement
to the effect that the patient is sound in wind and limb. The
patient may say to the physician that his certificate is for the
purpose of presenting it to some life-insurance company, yet to
be selected, in support of an application for insurance. Upon
receipt of the physician’s certificate the patient visits the office of
an insurance company and presents the medical certificate, which
is accepted by the company because it bears the name of a physi
cian known to be of good standing. The policy is written and
issued and shortly thereafter the patient develops symptoms of
tuberculosis, which must have been in his system at the time of
the medical examination. The physician, let us say, was negli
gent because he did not make those tests which he might have
made had he suspected the existence of tuberculosis. He relied
to some extent upon his knowledge of the history of the patient
and made merely an examination of a somewhat superficial
character. If the theory of total liability were to prevail the
insurance company in this supposed case could claim from the
physician the total amount of money paid to the beneficiary of
the policy in the event of death from tuberculosis. Surely, no
sane person would argue that such a burden of responsibility
would rest upon the physician’s shoulders. Or suppose that a
man intending to construct an office building instructs an archi
tect to prepare plans and specifications. These are accepted
and the building is erected. Subsequently, a company pur
chases the building from the original owner for use as a warehouse.
After the transaction has been consummated it is discovered that
there is a structural weakness which will prevent use of the build
ing for the purposes intended by the buyer. Would anyone
contend for a moment that the purchasing company could hold
the architect responsible financially for any loss or damage which
might result from that weakness?
The whole truth of the matter is that
the accountant is engaged in a pro
fession whose service chiefly consists
of rendering an opinion. The opinion truly is based upon in
vestigation and analysis, but it is still an opinion nevertheless.
If persons not directly concerned in the arrangement made by
the accountant and his client suffer loss because they depended
upon the opinion of the accountant, it is unfortunate for them.
128
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Nevertheless, the fact remains that they are third parties. If
the accountant, or any other professional man, is to be called
upon to bear a burden of responsibility to the entire world there
will have to be a great reform in the matter of fees. It is an
axiom of business that payment shall be based to a great extent
upon the element of risk involved. The iron worker who im
perils his life day by day on sky-scraper construction is paid a
far higher wage than he would receive for the same kind of work
on the ground. The man who works in certain departments
of a wire mill is paid for one day what men in other factories may
receive for a week’s labor. So it should be in the professions—
the man who assumes the risk of responsibility to everyone, past,
present and future, must fully deserve and receive a scale of com
pensation out of all proportion to the actual time and labor in
volved in the preparation of his work. We do not imagine that
the clients of accountants would be eager to encourage the adop
tion of any such principle as that of total liability were it accom
panied by the perfectly fair corollary of enormous fees. The
amounts which accountants now receive for their services are
not, as a rule, excessive. Sometimes one hears of an absurdly
high fee, but in the common run there is no excess.

But even assuming that a great advance
in fees might be obtainable, it seems
doubtful if any professional man would
care to pursue his vocation in the face of a world-wide liability.
It is gratifying to find that the decision of the supreme court of
New York follows generally the line of common sense, and it is
to be hoped that the decision will discourage some of the ridic
ulous attempts which are being made to extort money in the form
of damages from professional men. Of late years it has seemed
that there must be a kind of tacit understanding among clients
that when anything goes wrong the accountant should pay. Some
of the suits which have been entered and dropped have been
wholly ludicrous. Others, still before the courts, seem equally
absurd, and others are doubtful. No one yet knows to what
extent an accountant may be held personally and financially
liable for losses incurred by the client himself. The Ultra Mares
case disposes of the question of liability to third parties, but the
more difficult question of liability to the client is not determined.
Some people seem to believe that the accountant is to be held
129
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responsible for all losses. This is flattering, of course, but an
noying. Sometimes it seems to make no difference whether the
accountant was engaged before, during or after the occurrence
of the loss. He should have known all about what had happened
or could happen. If he was found to have warned his client and
his advice had been ignored, he was still to blame because he had
not insisted upon precautionary or redemptive action. If the
accountant’s activities were limited by the terms of his engage
ment so that he could not have known or discovered the unsound
ness that afterward expressed itself in misfortune, it would make
no difference whatever—he was an accountant, he should possess
superhuman faculties of discernment and the evil should not have
happened. The world has been looking these many centuries
for a personal devil who could be caught, kicked and compelled
to pay what is lost. If the accountant is as omniscient of good
and evil as some would have us believe, we have at last over
taken the culprit. There may be some question of the sufficiency
of the purse of evil to make good all that has gone glimmering
in the devious march of business—but that is a topic for another
day.
Within the past two or three years
Other Decisions
there has been a whole wardrobe of
Are Wanted
suits against accountants, based, it
appears, upon the notion that the accountant is legally liable
for everything that goes wrong. The amount of damages named
in some of these suits is as magniloquent as a war-loan appeal.
We are not now attempting to argue that the accountant is not
responsible to a certain extent for errors in judgment. Every
man is responsible for such things, but we have grave doubts
as to the extent of such liability. In one well known case it was
decided that the amount to be recovered by the plaintiff was
the fee actually paid to the accountant. In other cases where
damages of great amount have been named, there has been settle
ment in small amount out of court. The truth is that there is
nothing in the form of judgment which can be cited as an abso
lute precedent for the assessment of damages based upon the
extent of loss. The Ultra Mares case, we hope, settles for all
time the contention that third parties may participate in damage
suits except where damage to life or limb is concerned. What
is needed now to complete the record is a decision by some com
petent court on the extent to which an accountant may be held
130
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responsible for damage and loss in certain circumstances. For
example, it would be eminently desirable to have a judgment
in a case in which the accountant was clearly shown to have been
negligent. There should also be a decision in a case in which
the accountant was merely too superficial but not actually neg
ligent, and there should be a judgment in a case in which the
accountant was shown to have exercised every reasonable pre
caution and still failed to discover faulty conditions. We do not
believe that it is necessary to have a decision of a case in which
the accountant is found guilty of fraud. That sort of thing is
covered by an abundance of legal precedent.
The Federal Reserve Board and the
Verification of Financial
American
Institute of Accountants have
Statements
cause for gratification at the instant
response which followed the publication of the revised pamphlet,
Verification of Financial Statements. The first printing was
exhausted within a few weeks and the number of orders continues
to increase. The matter appeared first in The Journal of
Accountancy for May, 1929, and the sale of that issue of the
magazine indicated an intense interest in the text. Now the
immediate demand for the pamphlet reprints published by the
reserve board has exceeded the expectations of nearly everyone.
But that is not the most significant result of publication of the
instructions. The astonishing thing is that critics usually cap
tious have not found anything to condemn. The committee
which wrote the document must have done a thoroughly good
job. One of the ways in which the lessons contained in the
pamphlet can be most effectively inculcated is that adopted by
the California State Society of Certified Public Accountants.
That society has not only approved the instructions, but adopted
them. The action of the society was recorded in the Bulletin of
the American Institute of Accountants, July 15th, but the matter
is important enough to merit repetition. The following resolu
tions were unanimously adopted by the society:
No. 1
Whereas, the California State Society of Certified Public Accountants’
committee for cooperation with bankers and the committee on credit
practices of the California Bankers Association have recommended that
the requirements set forth in the revised bulletin, styled Verification of
Financial Statements, appearing in the May, 1929, issue of The Journal
of Accountancy as the basis of standards for certification of financial
statements be adopted; now therefore be it
Resolved, that the California State Society of Certified Public Account
ants determine that the minimum requirement for certification of financial
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statements shall be the standards set forth in the May, 1929, issue of The
Journal of Accountancy under the title Verification of Financial State
ments; be it further
Resolved, that if said minimum requirements have not been observed
in preparing said statements, each member of the California State Society
of Certified Public Accountants responsible for such certificate will indi
cate on the balance-sheet or so qualify the certificate appended to said
statements as to make full disclosure showing wherein such minimum
requirements have not been complied with; be it further
Resolved, that a copy of this resolution and the report of the committee
for cooperation with bankers be forwarded by registered mail to every
holder of a certified public accountancy certificate issued by the state of
California; be it further
Resolved, that an appropriate committee of the California State Society
of Certified Public Accountants be empowered to adopt rules and regula
tions for the carrying out of the intent and spirit of this resolution, in
cluding the right to consider complaints and make recommendations to
the board of directors thereon, and be it further
Resolved, that a copy of this resolution and the report of the committee
for cooperation with bankers be transmitted to the chairman of the com
mittee on credit practices of the California Bankers Association to be
presented at the forthcoming annual convention of the California Bankers
Association.
No. 2
Whereas, the California State Society of Certified Public Accountants
has adopted a resolution establishing minimum certification requirements
and has provided for the creation of a committee to be charged with the
responsibility of carrying out the intent and spirit of such resolution; now
therefore be it
Resolved, that a permanent committee of the California State Society
of Certified Public Accountants, to be styled the committee for coopera
tion with bankers, be created, consisting of the presidents of the San Fran
cisco and Los Angeles chapters of the society together with two addi
tional members from each chapter of the society to be appointed by the
president of the California State Society of Certified Public Accountants;
be it further
Resolved, that in order to preserve continuity of the policies of such com
mittee its members other than the presidents of the San Francisco and Los
Angeles chapters be appointed for a term of three years, and be it further
Resolved, that any vacancies which occur in the personnel of the com
mittee other than those arising from the expiration of term of office, as
hereinabove provided, be filled by the president of the society; be it further
Resolved, that the committee herein created for cooperation with bank
ers be and is hereby empowered jointly with the standing committee
on complaints to adopt rules and regulations for the carrying out of the
intent and spirit of the resolutions adopted this day providing for mini
mum requirement for certification of financial statements. Such joint
committee is empowered to consider any and all complaints relating to
certification of financial statements. The said joint committee is, how
ever, not authorized to take any action whatsoever in respect of any com
plaints except to make investigations and hold hearings and make a re
port and recommendations to the board of directors of the society on all
complaints referred to them for consideration.

Bankers have expressed a complete readiness to encourage
clients to permit the required thoroughness of investigation.
Leading accountants everywhere can do much to give effect to
the intentions of the authors and publishers of the pamphlet by
following the example set by California.
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